



Moral Economy: exploring a contested concept 
 
          Abstract: The intellectual resources on morality assembled in the previous chapter 
contribute to and facilitate the task of refining the conceptual device of moral economy. 
Accordingly, I now proceed from a preparatory discussion on the subject of morality, to 
the specifics of moral economy. It is urgent and vital to advance thinking on the content 
of, arguments for, the mode of conceptualisation and articulation of what is a contested 
concept. I also begin to weave moral economy with criminal justice and probation. 
 
From intellectual resources to the specifics of moral economy 
The previous chapter assembled some of the multi-layered intellectual resources to excavate 
the concept of the moral. This enquiry was funnelled to explore pertinent references to moral 
economy in the literature and the nature of its existence before and after the great 
transformation. The next step narrows the focus further by confirming that ethics is the 
philosophical study of moral questions, and the term ethics and morality have been used 
interchangeably in the previous chapter. Moral philosophers have reflected on the telos 
(τελός end) of morality, an exemplar being the aforementioned good life in Aristotle’s (2000) 
Nicomachean Ethics. Additionally, ethical systems address intrinsic worth and value. 
Arguably, neoliberal capitalism constitutes a politico-economic and ethical system concerned 
with the end of human existence. Here, the good life is premised upon the pursuit of personal 
gain from which everyone in the polis (πόλις) benefits as material wealth trickles down. The 
doctrinal creed is that greed, egoistically pursued, is so good that it results in beneficence for 
all. The verifiable and experiential flaw with this model is that how capitalism is supposed to 
work is not, in fact, how it does work. The evidence from Piketty’s (2014) monumental edifice 
that draws on extensive historical and comparative data sources on capitalist organisation is 
that it demonstrably sucks-up wealth more than it cascades down, and self-interest is self-
evidently not converted into benevolence. Let’s not be churlish and give credit where it’s due 
by acknowledging its exemplary capacity to create material wealth, but the system cannot 
guarantee that wealth is acquired fairly or distributed equitably. Material benefits come at 
the expense of socio-economic inequality that inflicts damage on all of us (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009). The material surface that shimmers with its tantalising promise of fiscal bliss 
masks an underbelly of disturbing unethical outcomes. I refer to capitalist organisation to 
make the case that it is conceptually, materially, and ethically different to the substance of 
moral economy, my primary concern. Marquand (2014) has a different take on the matter, 
which I dispute, because he employs the concept in looser fashion to argue that British 
history, over the last 200 years, has manifested four different moral economies. First, the 
period before the great transformation when moral economy was the ideological property of 
the crowd (Thompson, 1971); second, 19th century laissez-faire liberal capitalism; third, 
Keynesian social democracy that established the social-welfare state from 1945 until the late-
1970s. Finally, the neoliberal era since the 1980s that constitutes the historical parameter for 
the re-framing of criminal justice in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
This is not my usage because the operational circuits of capital accumulation and market 
expansion compete with the circuits of ethico-cultural contestation to produce different 
conditions of existence and individual subjectivity. Capitalist exchange relations, the 
extraction of time and resources from minds and bodies, exploitation, barbaric and violent 
competition between individuals and nations, are fixed in mortal combat with a moral 
economy of regard for others, the common welfare, and equality. A system where it is more 
blessed to receive than to give (exchange relations) is diametrically opposed to a system 
where it is more blessed to give than receive. Both have their historical progenitors, ends and 
aspirations, ways of organising and prioritising life in the polis, operating circuits and 
mechanisms of reproduction that have determinative anthropological and social implications. 
Capitalist political economy is a class project played out through markets, capital flows, 
investment opportunities, profit, self-interest and fearful competition, a free for all of un-
freedom exemplified by the unequal distribution of material resources and life opportunities. 
It privatizes state assets, liberalises global trade, deregulates financial institutions and labour, 
commercialises human life. It is by nature predatory (Galbraith, 2008), taking out more than 
it puts in. Since its revival in the neoliberal 1980s and paradoxically, but not unexpectedly, the 
great leap forward after the capitalist tremours of 2007/08, it inflicts social murder 
(Chernomas and Hudson, 2007), exacerbates social inequality which is a ‘fundamental feature 
of capitalism generally, [whose] reproduction is part of the logic of this system’ (Duménil and 
Lévy, 2004: 137).  
 
Accordingly, my main concern, informed by the cast of resources in chapter 1, is to direct 
attention to the content of, argument for, the mode of conceptualisation and articulation of 
moral economy. I advance the position that moral economy functions as a conceptual device 
to forge links with, and put into sharp relief, the probation ideal and rehabilitative ethic in the 
criminal justice system which have been systematically dismantled through the politics of 
disavowal over recent decades. It also demonstrates, during the next two chapters, that the 
period before the 1980s was different to what followed. It is evidentially the case that ‘They 
did things differently then, and thought and felt differently’ (Burrow, 2009: 115). The 
conceptual lens of moral economy folds into the Weberian ideal type, a methodological 
procedure that compensates for investigative limitations in the social sciences. If social 
phenomena are ambiguous and cannot be observed directly, the ideal type is constructed to 
discover the relevant properties of what is subjected to investigation. Moral economy, as 
conceptual device or ideal type, accentuates certain features of reality. In other words, it is a 
caricature related to reality, but not its exact representation. Consequently, it functions as a 
heuristic device, it is elucidatory, identifies traits, advances comparative analysis and can be 
put to work to expose intellectual and moral deficiency. 
 
Building Content 
The concept of moral economy is indubitably complex, contested, and ambiguous, but not 
insignificant. The following sketch may be disposed of as too speculative and theoretically 
abstract, with little prospect of implementation in the near or distant future. In other words, 
it is too Platonically metaphysical to be of any Aristotelian earthly good. Nevertheless, it is a 
concept requiring careful consideration. The starting point for this reconstruction is that the 
foundational content of moral economy asserts the unconditional value of human existence. 
Schweitzer’s anthropological ethic advanced a life-view where the primary principle of the 
moral is reverence for life. Its inviolable and personal nature is in and of itself self-sufficiently 
and self-evidently good. This is the platform upon which to conduct human relations, its 
sphere of interest encapsulating just and right dealings within the organisation of the polis. It 
is a life-view with micro (individual subjectivity), mezzo (organisational) and macro (political 
economy) dimensions. Its content can be further enriched by the Kantian kingdom of ends, 
not calculable means; Weberian substantive rationality, not instrumental rationality as the 
motivation for social action; benevolence is valued more highly than egoistic self-interest. 
This requires a decisive yet difficult move from the self to the other to establish inter-
subjective social relations of mutuality, empathy, and trust. When Schweitzer issued the 
invitation in the aftermath of the First World War to ‘look for a human being or some work 
devoted to human welfare’ (1929: 260), it was not possible for everyone to emulate 
Bonhoeffer in activating an ethical injunction that sacrificially cost his life. However, social 
workers, probation officers, and others employed in the people-facing professions 
assimilated this ethical rationality within their respective organisations. Probation work, 
within the criminal justice system, was an integral component of the post-war Keynesian 
settlement (Skidelsky, 2003) as a public good, delivering a public service, as a public duty, 
largely to a disadvantaged section of the public. It belonged to the personal social services 
that operationalised a personalist ethic until, that is, the profession was trashed by the politics 
of New Public Management and its supporting musculature of managerial consultants. 
Probation’s pioneering mission constructed structural, cultural, and biographical analyses of 
the human condition to understand and explain offending behaviour, an intellectual and 
moral task on behalf of the state and criminal justice system. 
  
Schweitzer and Bonhoeffer on civilization and philosophical ethics, Küngian theology and 
Christology, Pauline epistolary resources appertaining to political ethics, the Judaeo-Christian 
inheritance, entreaties on personalism and the Symbolic order, assert the ethico-cultural 
significance of being men and women for others as the definitive norm of responsibility and 
maturity. This requires a transformed politico-ethical order that eradicates socially 
constructed binaries. It is committed to agapē (ἀγάπη), a veritable scandal because it 
represents a radical challenge to the organisation of life immersed in self-interest, extracting 
from others to advance the self. The content of moral economy is enriched by Badiou’s 
references to Abrahamic and Pauline exemplars where equality constitutes a material sign of 
the universal. Indubitably all citizens in the polis matter and socially constructed binary 
distinctions, the extreme differential allocation of material resources, the signs and symbols 
of material success and status, must be transcended. Transcendence is achieved through 
commitment to a higher unity that for some is the theologian’s God, or Other. For others a 
Symbolic order, or Big Other, that fashions a subjectivity different to that required by the 
capitalist system. Moral economy makes demands, requires existential choices, and is 
sacrificially costly in human resources and time. It functions within the circuits of a value 
system where it is preferable to give than receive, agapē not exchange relations, where 
humanity is one and not divided by the cult of narcissistic hyper-individualism. It is in marked 
contrast to politico-economic and social organisation that favour an elite who acquire a surfeit 
of power and material resources, wielded over others to maintain and reproduce a 
competitive advantage. Its symbol is a sacrificial and renunciating cross (σταυρός), not the 
semiotics of material excess so highly prized by consumer culture and its media outlets. It is 
dialogic, face-to-face not in your face, and it is as absurd and scandalous as unorthodox. It 
cuts against the grain by challenging the way the world is in arguing for justice (δικαιοσύνη), 
fairness, equality, and the virtues of moral excellence and goodness. Moral economy is 
preoccupied with the requisite content to further the good life in the polis. 
 
James Joyce (see Kiberd, 2009), as literary artist, conveyed the moral vision in Ulysses that 
public spaces, the streets where people come into contact with each other, teach social 
relations. During the early 20th century Joyce was aware of much wrongdoing - Dublin 
subjected to the imperial yoke of the British Empire, the baleful influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church from birth to death, Irish and Jews as hated peoples, the great weight of 
history pressing down with force, hatred, racism and bigotry. These were not the components 
of agapē (ἀγάπη), this was not life, yet ‘Growth is possible, even for settled citizens like Bloom, 
through openness to the Other, a willingness to talk with those who might seem different’ 
(2009: 246). Similarly, for George Eliot in Middlemarch, human relationships are 
unquestionably complex but if taken seriously they come with the invitation to grow beyond 
self-centeredness: ‘If I really care for you – if I try to think myself into your position and 
orientation – then the world is bettered by my effort at understanding and comprehension’ 
(Mead, 2014: 223 – the social worker’s and probation officer’s creed). Empathy and 
imaginative understanding attenuate egoism, so that human growth is possible through 
openness to others, in taking the step from self to other, from the closed world of the ego to 
inter-subjective relations. It is the leap from darkness to light, nature to culture, the fusion of 
imaginary and symbolic, resonating with the injunction that in order to find oneself one must 
lose oneself in the Ethical Life. Moral economy is doing good not evil, it strengthens the 
fainthearted, supports the weak, helps the afflicted; it is agapē, service, and the capacity for 
self-sacrifice. Although human beings act from questionable motives, we are nevertheless 
capable of sympathy, benevolence, and, as Adam Smith deduced, show an interest in the 
fortune of others (1759/2009: 13). Not to do this is a persistent threat to the stability of the 
socio-moral order. 
 
To repeat, the concept of moral economy is complex and contested. It is enshrouded in 
ambiguity and ambivalence, and some might say irrelevance. However, it is not insignificant 
because, historically and culturally, it informed the work of the criminal justice system 
through the probation ideal. Probation, from its statutory beginnings during the early 20th 
century, has performed tasks on behalf of the state whilst operating with a measure of 
organisational independence until, that is, relatively recently. Its rationale, although 
containing a mélange of competing ideological perspectives (see Whitehead, 2010 on various 
models of practice), exemplified a humane approach to understanding the biological, 
psychological, and sociological correlates of offending behaviour. It was also, at its very best, 
a humanising influence throughout the whole system. Probation officers responded to 
Schweitzer’s advice to find vocational work to facilitate human welfare through which they 
could make a difference as well as make a living. They understood something of and practiced 
reverence for life (towards offenders, victims and local communities), criminal and social 
justice. They implemented a life-view that blended cognitive insight with empathic sensibility, 
professional duty to the courts and passion for the job conducted through relationships that 
combined the professional and personal. Moral economy is not identical to the probation 
ideal, but functions as a conceptual device to bring into view a moral dimension to probation 
practice expressed in the terminology of the rehabilitative ethic. So a trinity of overlapping 
components: an intellectually supportive moral economy; the probation ideal; and 
rehabilitative ethic (see extended discussion in Whitehead, 2010: 65-81 for these 
archaeological deposits). The central features of the probation ideal were as follows:  
 Informed by religious, humanitarian and personalist impulses that combined to 
humanise the criminal justice system. 
 Utilised the human sciences, from psychology to criminology and social theory, to 
excavate the aetiology of complex behavioural patterns. Understanding incorporated 
both what and why dimensions (what have you done and why have you done it?) to 
explain offending to magistrates and judges by taking account of structural, cultural, 
and biographical variables (Whitehead and Thompson, 2004).  
 From a Joycean perspective the probation ideal involved openness to the other and a 
curiosity about behavioural repertoires. It concurred with George Eliot that the world 
can be a better place by understanding and comprehension, which was the function 
of the Social Enquiry Report to advance. 
 The probation ideal supported a constructive and educative approach in the 
community wherever possible, which symbolised something more positive than 
punishment and prison. It was part of the personal social work services, not retributive 
punishment. 
 Operated with a narrative of tolerance, human decency, caring control and 
compassion, empathy, support and help which was its vocational public duty. 
 Believed that people can change and so did not give up on others. Relationships were 
at the centre of practice – good and right in themselves, and effective. Maruna (2001) 
asserted that offenders can be immersed into a new symbolic order through metanoia 
(μετανοια as a change of heart and mind). 
 It explicated that probation officers were the social workers of the criminal and civil 
courts, therefore different to other staff within the organisations of criminal justice. 
 The probation ideal included intellectual curiosity and moral obligation, qualitative 
service outputs, deontological ethics, substantive rationality, and the rehabilitative 
ethic. In other words, probation work and its diverse services could be justified by 
being good and right in themselves. Probation may not reduce reoffending; it may 
accomplish ‘nothing’. Rather, good for its own sake and operated a good will, which 
has been relegated to the un-modern. This is the probation ideal, ethic, and aesthetic. 
Although there are well rehearsed objections to the rehabilitative ethic that reach back to the 
1970s, it complemented the probation ideal. But the collapse of the rehabilitative ethic in 
conjunction with the probation ideal has created an intellectual and moral vacuum in criminal 
justice (Bottoms and Preston, 1980; Garland, 1985 and 2001). In fact ‘The collapse of this 
model exposes us to the moral debate about the values which should be operative in our 
criminal justice system’ (Wood, 1991: 61 which anticipates Faulkner’s letter of 1993 later). 
This discussion on the content of moral economy that overlaps with the probation ideal and 
rehabilitative ethic, asserts that the past was unlike the present morally and intellectually, 
cognitively and emotionally; things were different then. The jewel that used to shine in 
Kantian fashion has been cast aside and crushed by the politics of disavowal and relegation 
into the Real (chapters 3 and 4). When turning from content to argument in support of moral 
economy, a few general comments to start with. 
 
Supportive Arguments 
Whether we like it or not – sometimes we don’t, hell can be other people, we are attracted 
to and repulsed by the Nietzschean herd, the neighbour as enemy and competitor, and there 
could be a biological deficiency militating against benevolence (Harari, 2014) - it is difficult to 
avoid contact with others within the close proximity of family, work place and dole queue, 
the Joycean street, civil and uncivil society. The argument for moral economy is that it 
conduces to inter-subjective social relations, promoting the bonds of Durkheimian social 
solidarity and universality. So, theoretically and empirically, it conduces to self-preservation 
and is in the enlightened best interests of all of us (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). The weight 
of evidence suggests that more equal societies almost always do better on a range of social 
indicators - mental illness and drug use, ill-health and lower life expectancy, obesity, 
educational performance, including violence, crime, punishment and imprisonment. When 
confronted with the strength of this evidence the logical implication is to reduce elongated 
hierarchies, the acme of which is occupied by the elite comptrollers of the material universe. 
Inequality creates dysfunctional societies through the production of social pathologies rooted 
in material differences. Of the major economies in Europe none are more unequal than Britain 
(Piketty, 2014). For Hippodamos, in classical antiquity, the individual achieves happiness and 
perfection in a group ‘for the individual and the community are coterminous’ (Blumenfeld, 
2001: 181). This moral code informed Pauline political ethics with its existential burden to 
reconstruct the polis. In fact, the political ethics of Romans 12v9 to 13v7 is a manual of moral 
excellence that ‘connects the individual’s proper end with the collective end’ (Blumenfeld, 
2001: 386). This is the Hegelian point that morality appertains to social organisation, not the 
will to power of atomistic individuals at the expense of others (Plant, 1973). 
 
The argument advanced is that the content of moral economy establishes normative 
principles, intellectually supported ground rules, that are not only good in themselves but 
facilitate the good life for all citizens (Aristotle, 2000). There is an ethico-cultural tradition 
connecting Hippodamos, Aristotle, Pauline ethics, Schweitzer, Wilkinson and Pickett. This 
tradition includes Küng whose global ethic establishes minimum ‘human values, criteria and 
basic attitudes’ (1998: 92). It is a matter of wisdom, logic, rationality, and aesthetics to 
endorse moral economy, in contradistinction to capitalist political economy, as a normative 
code of virtue by which to get ourselves organized. Klein (2014), from a psychological 
perspective, argues that living within the circuits of moral economy make us feel better about 
ourselves. This resonates with Plato’s Republic (1974) where justice (δικαιοσύνη) is beneficial 
to psychic health. In other words, the just or moral person is happier than the unjust. 
Additionally, Pinker (2015), a developmental psychologist, has undertaken empirical research 
that supports the position that the internet age makes us unhappy. It is damaging our social 
natures, isolating us from each other through pseudo-superficial human contacts and 
relations. Philosophically, theologically, sociologically, and psychologically, it is better to give 
than receive, good begets good, and virtue is its own reward. The supporting arguments for 
moral economy direct our thinking towards political ethics where they were located in 
classical antiquity. Regardless of moral debates, the diversity of ethical systems, and 
aetiological questions, it seems a good idea, a matter of practical reason, to consider moral 
economy as a foundational life-view. To do otherwise is stupid because it detracts from the 
possibility of human happiness and the good life for all. Put simply, we need each other. 
 
By reflecting on these supportive arguments, the opportunity is presented to move from the 
world as it is to what it could be. The intellectual resources on morality synthesised in the 
previous chapter, and the content of and arguments for moral economy under consideration 
here, offer us half a chance to live together through sharing in the abundance of the world’s 
material, intellectual, and ethico-cultural resources. Cooperation not barbaric competition 
make us more rather than less human, leading to growth of refined sensibilities and an 
enhanced understanding of each other, including criminal behavioural repertoires (Hall, 
2012). Of course, the formulation of content and articulation of argument will not convince 
everyone, easily dismissed as an irrelevant distraction from life’s material priorities and 
obsession with economic growth. The objection is that the content is unrealistic and 
supportive arguments unconvincing, passé and unmodern. The Nietzschean Übermensch is 
contemptuous of virtuous egalitarian neighbourliness and equality. It represents an ethic that 
degrades the human stock that must be transcended into a higher form of aristocratic life 
through the will to power. The Nietzschean emphasis is aesthetics not ethics and, as Kenny 
elucidates, Nietzsche’s ‘ideal human being not only does not love his neighbour: he has no 
neighbour’ (2010: 939). 
 
We can turn to intellectual considerations of moral economy not only to critique the present 
but also inform existential decisions about the future. Political, social, and economic 
organisation should not be reduced to technical specificities, computer modelling, cost-
benefit analyses, or risk assessment. From Plato and Aristotle, Paul and Hegel, to Keynes and 
Piketty, these are intellectual and moral matters that are foundationally required to promote 
the general welfare over self-interest which has implications for the rationality of criminal 
justice. The weight of evidence suggests that this has never happened and it is the last thing 
we want, even after the material crisis of 2007-08. Mumford (1940: 572), berating the 
limitations of liberalism, stated that ‘universal principles and values give purpose and 
direction to human life’. Furthermore, Sandel argues that a ‘politics of moral engagement is 
not only a more inspiring ideal than a politics of avoidance. It is also a more promising basis 
for a just society’ (2009: 269). From these general comments let’s turn to the specifics of 
criminal justice.  
 
As with content, so too with argument, the contours of morality operated in the circuits of 
the criminal justice system, an important (by no means only) source was the probation ideal 
and rehabilitative ethic. This was a central reproductive and state supported mechanism 
which is disrupted by applying market-driven concepts to organisational structures that 
previously transcended market operations. There was a moral dynamic to probation practice 
exemplified in the dialectics of criminal justice that pursued truth and justice through dialogic 
argument. There is no political philosophy of left or right, criminological theory, or 
organisational component of the system – magistrates, judges, clerks, solicitors, barristers, 
crown prosecution service, police or probation – that can rightfully claim a monopoly on truth 
and justice. Nevertheless, each organisation with its unique historical formation, professional 
culture, primary task, and reproductive ethico-cultural mechanisms can combine dialectically 
to advance different perspectives on the meaning of criminal and social justice. Organisational 
contestation conduces to negotiated outcomes through contradiction, argument, and 
sometimes conflict (more so than collapsing differences through reducing cultural divides 
which terminates in the bland leading the bland; see chapter 3 on the National Offender 
Management Service). Any justice system that overly relied on prosecution evidence supplied 
to magistrates’ and crown court judges from the police and crown prosecution service, would 
provoke a serious challenge to truth, justice, and fairness because of what it omitted by being 
reductively concerned only with what the offender has done. Equally, to rely solely on a 
personalist ideology, social work explanations, respect for persons in some ideal kingdom of 
ends, would be rightly challenged by victims and local communities according to the same 
demand for truth, justice, and fairness. Consequently, the argument is that both perspectives 
are required, what someone has done as well as understanding why. But this delicate balance 
has been un-balanced by modernisation from above, excessive political interference, a 
permanent revolution of repeated organisational restructuring, the erosion of sociological 
analyses and the hollowing out of intellectual and ethico-cultural exploration. This 
transformation is contingent upon the decline of the probation ideal, the rehabilitative ethic, 
and supporting intellectual and moral arguments. The system has shifted from the dialectics 
of negotiated outcomes operating within a contested space, to a reductionist politics of 
coercive imposition by the political class for strategic reasons rather than the primary cause 
of justice. Thinking about doing justice is structured within political and fiscal parameters, but 
it must also be informed by the intellectual and moral resources assembled in chapter 1. If 
not then the foundations of criminal and social justice will be undermined, as assuredly they 
have been. To do what is just and right self-evidently requires intellectual curiosity and moral 
sensibility. Probation was a guarantor of this vital perspective, but no longer because it has 
been declared out of time, out of step, and out of sorts with the latest great transformation 
of the state. Amartya Sen (2009), invoking Adam Smith (1759/2009), with a trace of Joyce and 
Eliot, argues that reasoned and critical scrutiny, to accommodate different intellectual 
positions, is a basic requirement for ethical and political conviction. The need to ‘transcend 
the limitations of our positional perspectives is important in moral and political philosophy, 
and in jurisprudence’ (Sen 2009, 155). Public reasoning, critical discussion, listening to and 
learning from others, and assimilating different viewpoints, is central to the intellectual and 
moral process of criminal and social justice. 
 
Mode of conceptualisation and articulation 
Like Eagleton’s (2014) disquisition on God or Lacan and Žižek on the Symbolic (Big Other), 
moral economy is ambiguous, sometimes unrecognisable, betrays a mythical quality, and it 
does not readily elicit assent to its entreaties. However, it has the capacity to challenge, 
disturb and disrupt behavioural routines and organisational rationalities. It is not part of 
nature, or in its nature, to impose itself coercively in the manner of Nietzschean will to power. 
Rather, it is subtle in its intimation and invitation through its scattered historical and 
contemporary deposits. It takes issue with the way the world is, the images we construct of 
the self that reflect and reproduce the neoliberal politico-economic order with its material 
signs, status symbols, and all too ephemeral definitions of success. It allows itself to be pushed 
out of the world, onto a cross, towards the extremity of the inexplicable Real beyond the 
Symbolic. It does not, never has, probably never will, effect a permanent revolution in human 
affairs as it is easily deflected and often defeated although never permanently expunged, 
again like Eagleton’s God. The crushing weight of history and present arrangements are 
stacked against it. Moral economy, like the Pauline politico-ethical state (Blumenfeld, 2001: 
389) did not constitute a threat to the Roman Empire, because it operated as a parallel not 
usurpatory state, but with the efficacy to be transformative. It disturbs, disarms, and comforts 
the human condition, yet it is a paradox because the content of moral economy is not averse 
to making an egregious appearance on celebratory state occasions. At the National Service of 
Thanksgiving to mark the Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen, in Saint Paul’s Cathedral 
on Tuesday June 5th 2012, the blessing from the Archbishop of Canterbury enjoined the 
departing congregation to function within the circuits of moral economy: go forth into the 
world in peace; be of good courage; hold fast that which is good; render to no one evil for 
evil; strengthen the fainthearted and support the weak; help the afflicted and honour 
everyone. Expeditiously, state power vacated the sacred pew to sustain the material 
platform, as the reproduction of exchange relations continues its relentless march in 
maintaining inequality and injustice throughout the social structure. 
 
Moral economy is imperceptible and ineffable, but affective, expressive, and sometimes 
practiced as not all relations between human beings are exchange relations. Hume 
acknowledged that human beings are not solely motivated by self-interest. There are a 
thousand instances which are the ‘marks of a general benevolence in human nature’ 
(1777/1983: 92). Similarly, Smith (1759/2009: 48) endorsed the pleasing social passions of 
generosity, kindness, and compassion.  It should be repeated that moral economy, like 
political economy, does not intrinsically belong to the structure of the world. It relies on the 
renewal of existential commitment to its distinctive content and supportive arguments. It can 
be avoided, we can look the other way, heave our shoulder against it. We can choose an 
alternative course of action and fill the void at the core of human existence with an alternative 
symbolic content. There are many competitors clamouring for our attention in the market 
place of ideological life-styles. But in doing so we must face the consequences of our actions 
that will inevitably follow. The threads of moral economy, like the veneer of civilization, have 
a tenuous hold over the human condition and can all too quickly slide into barbarism. It is 
insecure and impermanent unless defended, advocated, and advanced by all of us in our 
personal relations, the organisation of the polis, and organisational forms of life that include 
the criminal justice system. 
 
Schweitzer’s life-view of reverence for life transcended the savage conflict enjoined by the 
Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance of Central Powers in the First World War, but it was 
not the platform for the post-war reconstruction in Europe, not did it prevent World War Two. 
However, the intellectual community would profit from re-acquaintance with Civilisation and 
Ethics (1929). Bonhoeffer’s work on Ethics (1955) did not save the German state or Church in 
the 1930s, nor did it defeat racism or even prevent his own execution in April 1945, yet his 
theological and Christological legacy survives to inform thinking about morality in this 
monograph. The Judaeo-Christian ethic did not transform the Roman Empire of the Caesars. 
It did not create a new world order based upon a political ethic of agapē, or usher in the 
Kingdom of God because it ended in ‘defeat’ on a cross. But there are those who conduct 
their lives according to its code and bear witness to its efficacy to transform existence through 
immersion in a new Symbolic order. This intellectual, ethico-cultural legacy informs the 
outputs of Badiou and Žižek. It may not be feasible to imagine a perfect state of moral 
economy rather than capitalist political economy. It is, however, more feasible to factor the 
deposits of moral economy into discussions on political organisation to analyse, critique, and 
to offer alternative perspectives. This will not be a comfortable ride. Furthermore, the content 
of, arguments for, and the mode of conceptualisation and articulation of moral economy has 
implications for the criminal justice system. Accordingly, the intellectual resources on 
morality assembled in chapter 1, and specific attention directed towards the conceptual 
device of moral economy in chapter 2, must now be put to work. 
